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DIGNITY TAKINGS, DIGNITY RESTORATION: A TORT LAW 
PERSPECTIVE
VALERIE P. HANS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Bernadette Atuahene identified several objectives for the Dignity 
Takings/Dignity Restoration Symposium organized at the Chicago-Kent 
College of Law.1 Her first goal for the symposium was that it serve as a law 
and society reclamation project. Her ambition for conference participants 
was for them to move beyond the traditional constitutional analysis of 
property takings to consider the multiple ways that takings occur. Law and 
society scholars often urge us to move beyond law on the books to law in 
action.2 Embracing this tradition, Bernadette Atuahene encouraged 
conference participants to push beyond takings “on the books” to takings 
“in action,” and to focus in particular on the dignitary consequences of 
takings.
A second ambition for the symposium was to broaden the 
conversation about the restoration of dignity after a taking. She posed a 
variety of questions for conference participants to consider. If one has 
suffered a taking that results in the loss of one’s dignity, what is required 
for adequate restoration of that dignity? Given that private property may be 
commandeered for public purposes,3 how does this public purpose of a 
taking of property figure into the restoration process? And how does one 
* Valerie P. Hans is Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Preparation of this article was supported by 
National Science Foundation Grant SES-1536238: “Quantitative Judgments in Law: Studies of Damage 
Award Decision Making” to Valerie P. Hans and Valerie F. Reyna. Jennifer Robbennolt and I analyzed 
tort law purposes and damage award decisions in our coauthored work, and I draw on that material here. 
My thinking about tort law and damage awards has also been deeply influenced by my research with 
Valerie Reyna. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Valerie P. Hans, Cornell 
Law School, Ithaca, NY 14853. E-mail: valerie.hans@cornell.edu.
1. Bernadette Atuahene, Welcome and Introduction, Dignity Takings/Dignity Restoration: A 
Symposium. Chicago-Kent College of Law (Nov. 10, 2016). 
2. The classic citation distinguishing law on the books, or black letter law, and the law in action, 
the application of the laws, is Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 
(1910). 
3. See generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. P(ĕ$/9(5, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PROPERTY THEORY (2012).
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restore dignity when the dignitary impact of a taking falls not only on an 
individual, but also on a group?
The third motivation of the symposium was to present 
interdisciplinary perspectives on dignity takings and dignity restoration. 
Hence the presenters included not only legal scholars but also scholars with 
backgrounds in the fields of education, English, history, political science, 
and sociology. These diverse presenters drew on their often distinctive 
disciplinary and theoretical perspectives to offer new approaches to the 
subjects of dignity takings and dignity restoration. Lasana Harris and I, 
both trained as psychologists, provided closing remarks. In addition to the 
disciplinary mix, scholars also drew on other domains of law, including tort 
law, criminal law, the law of war, civil rights, and employment law, for 
insights into the taking and restoration of dignity.
A rich group of symposium papers, and the resulting articles featured 
in this special issue of the Chicago-Kent Law Review, more than met the 
symposium’s objectives. Authors employed, as a springboard, Atuahene’s 
ground-breaking research on dignity takings and dignity restoration in the 
field of property law.4 Building upon insights from the procedural justice 
literature, her case study of South African land restoration introduced the 
idea of dignity takings, defined as takings of property that are accompanied 
by dehumanization or infantilization.5 Atuahene asserted that, to achieve 
adequate dignity restoration, remedies for dignity takings must be done 
through processes that affirm and reinforce the dignity of the individuals 
who are affected by such takings.6 The case study analyzed the perceived 
fairness of dignity restoration efforts in the context of the South African 
land restitution program, following the country’s transition from apartheid 
to democracy.7 She found that having a voice in the proceedings, and being 
treated with dignity and respect—two key features found to be important in
the procedural justice literature—were strongly associated with 
participants’ perceptions of fairness.8 Although the South African Land 
4. BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S
LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM (2014) [hereinafter ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS]; Bernadette 
Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical Framework for 
Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 796 
(2016) [hereinafter Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration]; Bernadette Atuahene, Takings 
as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 171 (2016).
5. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 4, at 796. 
6. Id.
7. See generally ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS, supra note 4.
8. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (identifying the major features 
associated with perceptions of justice). 
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Claims Commission was partially successful in its efforts to achieve 
equitable remedies, it fell short of fully restoring the dignity of the 
dispossessed, Atuahene concluded.9
The twin notions of dignity takings and dignity restoration provided a 
productive framework for participants at the conference. I was invited in 
my closing remarks, and in this essay, to focus specifically on the concept 
of dignity restoration. Following Bernadette Atuahene’s encouragement to 
think outside the box, I draw on tort law theory and on research about tort 
damages to reflect on the links between monetary compensation and 
dignity restoration. I highlight how a corrective justice perspective in tort 
law emphasizes the relationship between the wrongdoer and the injured 
person. The remedy of money damages helps to reestablish an equitable 
relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff and to reassert the 
worth and the dignity of the plaintiff. Reflecting on issues discussed at the 
conference, I consider how to assess the adequacy of money damages for 
dignity restoration. I also analyze what empirical evidence suggests about 
the significance of the source of the financial compensation for dignity 
restoration.
II. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND DIGNITY RESTORATION
As conference presenters analyzed dignity takings and dignity 
restoration in their specific areas, they underscored the fact that the legal
system has multiple goals, some of which are centrally associated with 
concepts of dignity and the relationship between the parties, and other 
goals which are not. Analysts of the tort system, for example, often divide 
the aims of tort law into deterrence and corrective justice.10 A prime goal of 
tort law is deterring harmful behavior, giving “actors appropriate incentives 
to engage in safe conduct.”11 There is a rich literature on deterrence in tort 
law.12 However, most of that literature focuses squarely on controlling the 
actions of the defendant. The relationship between the defendant and the 
plaintiff is not central to the deterrence goal.
But if we consider other goals of the tort system, the defendant-
plaintiff relationship is extraordinarily important. The relationship is 
9. See generally ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS, supra note 4.
10. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW (4th ed. 
2012); JENNIFER ROBBENNOLT & VALERIE P. HANS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TORT LAW (2016).
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §6 cmt. d (AM.
LAW INST. 2010).
12. For a review, see Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN.
L. REV. 115 (1993). 
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especially significant in the tort cases involving dignitary wrongs, such as 
offensive battery, assault, and false imprisonment, but it is not exclusive to 
them.13 The corrective justice rationale for tort law anticipates that 
“imposing liability remedies an injustice done by the defendant to the 
plaintiff.”14 Tort law aims to offer a mechanism for remedying wrongs, to 
fairly allocate the costs of injuries, and to compensate the injured.
In civil recourse and corrective justice theories of tort law, there is a 
strong emphasis on the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff. 
In the theory of civil recourse, the idea is to provide a vehicle for plaintiffs 
to seek redress from those who have wronged them.15 The corrective 
justice perspective insists on reasserting the moral and relationship balance 
between the defendant and the plaintiff.16 A verdict of liability 
communicates the message that the defendant has wronged the plaintiff. 
The application of a tort remedy stands for the righting of that wrong 
between the parties. Money damages are meant to remedy that wrong and 
to redress the imbalance between defendant and plaintiff.
In addition to providing valuable monetary compensation for the 
specific injuries the plaintiff has experienced, money damages can also 
serve as a vehicle for restoring the dignity of the plaintiff. Some claimants 
are motivated to bring a lawsuit not only because of the financial award, 
but also because a public judgment of liability can “place responsibility on
an offender, moderate any self-blame, recognize and affirm the societal 
norm that was violated, and communicate to an injured party that he is a 
respected member of the community.”17
The symposium motivates us to ask a question that should apply 
equally to both tort and property cases. For example, to what extent are 
money damages effective in restoring the dignity of a plaintiff? Jennifer 
Robbennolt and I recently analyzed the dignitary implications of money 
damages in tort cases.18 Like many plaintiffs who have experienced the 
taking of property, most tort plaintiffs are centrally concerned with the 
financial dimensions of their situations. Money damages can help 
compensate for lost wages, high medical bills, and other negative financial 
consequences of their injuries. But psychological factors, including desires 
13. JAMES A. HENDERSON JR., RICHARD N. PEARSON, DOUGLAS KYSAR & JOHN A. SILICIANO,
THE TORTS PROCESS 729–40 (8th ed. 2012).
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 cmt. d.
15. See e.g., John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the 
Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998).
16. ROBBENNOLT & HANS, supra note 10.
17. Id. at 19.
18. Id. at 2–4. 
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for fair treatment, acknowledgment, and apology, are also significant 
motivations for tort plaintiffs.19 Janice Nadler and Shari Seidman Diamond 
have discovered that these psychological factors are also important to 
plaintiffs in property cases.20 In both domains of law, money damages are 
attractive in part because they send a message that the plaintiff is a 
worthwhile individual, a message that helps to reestablish equity between 
the parties.
The dignitary impact of money damages gives rise to several 
questions. First, how much money is necessary as adequate compensation 
for the loss of dignity? In U.S. civil trials, we leave this difficult and 
challenging determination to the factfinder, either the judge or the jury. In 
determining what amount of money will fairly and adequately compensate 
the plaintiff, juries take into account the context of the injury and the 
identities and relationship of the defendant and the plaintiff.21 Lawyers, 
arbitrators, and insurance adjusters take into account the overall context 
and the relationship between the parties, as well as benchmarks from Jury 
Verdict Reporters or other sources, as they offer financial compensation 
and settle or resolve cases.
Inevitably, the assessment of the adequacy of an award or settlement 
is a comparative, contextual judgment.22 Consider, for example, the $20 
million settlement that Fox News’s parent company provided to the former 
Fox News anchor Gretchen Carlson to resolve her claims of workplace
sexual harassment by her boss Roger Ailes.23 The financial settlement was 
accompanied by a public apology “for the fact that Gretchen was not 
treated with the respect and dignity that she and all of our colleagues 
deserve.”24 The substantial financial settlement, described as 
“unprecedented” in size for a sexual harassment suit, was seen as a strong 
vindication.25 A Washington lawyer who regularly represents claimants in 
19. Id. at 115 (describing psychological factors in tort cases).
20. See, e.g., Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of 
Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 713 (2008) (describing psychological factors in property cases).
21. See Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to Quantitative 
Translation in Jury Damage Awards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120 (2011).
22. Id.; NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 281–302 (2007).
23. Michael M. Grynbaum & John Koblin, Fox Settles with Gretchen Carlson over Roger Ailes 
Sexual Harassment Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/business/media/fox-news-roger-ailes-gretchen-carlson-sexual-
harassment-lawsuit-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/5WHF-S9G5]. 
24. Id.
25. Paul Farhi, $20 Million Settlement and a Host’s Abrupt Exit Add to Fox’s Summer of 
Discontent, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/former-fox-
host-gretchen-carlson-settles-sexual-harassment-lawsuit-against-roger-ailes-for-20-
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sexual harassment lawsuits observed that the large payment to Carlson 
“clearly is a recognition that she was right that she was treated 
inappropriately, and that in and of itself is quite stunning.”26 Here, the 
comparison between the size of a typical sexual harassment settlement and 
Carlson’s settlement reinforced the ideas that her injury was serious, and 
that a substantial settlement was required to restore her dignity.
However, commentators regularly compared Carlson’s $20 million 
settlement to Roger Ailes’s $40 million exit package from Fox, a 
comparison that seemed to imply that the harassing Ailes remained in an 
inequitable and superior status to the harassed Carlson.27 One observer 
noted, “compared both to Fox’s revenues of $2.3 billion and the $40 
million golden parachute Roger Ailes supposedly received for leaving Fox 
in the wake of the harassment allegations, Carlson’s lawsuit ultimately 
doesn’t make a huge dent.”28
Another example that illustrates the significance of comparison and 
context in assessing the dignity-restoring power of money damages comes 
from the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund.29 Kenneth Feinberg served as 
the fund’s special master and determined compensation in individual cases. 
As special master, he confronted “a huge responsibility . . . putting price 
tags on lost loved ones’ lives—and of survivors’ aspirations.”30 Feinberg
was required by statute to base the victims’ economic compensation on the 
victims’ actual economic losses. But that set up painfully obvious 
differences in settlement amounts. He reported that some families reacted 
to the different settlement amounts with resentment: “Widows of 
firefighters and military men could not understand why they would receive 
less from the fund than the stockbrokers’ widows. Why was the 
government devaluing the lives of the heroes at the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon by awarding more to wealthier civilians?”31
Funds were also set aside to compensate the survivors and victims’ 
families for pain and suffering. In one raucous meeting, Feinberg heard 
from families who asserted that they or their loved ones had suffered more 
million/2016/09/06/f1718310-7434-11e6-be4f-
3f42f2e5a49e_story.html?utm_term=.f859b3fe2407[https://perma.cc/W5YR-EUNZ]. 
26. Id.
27. Id.; Grynbaum & Koblin, supra note 23.
28. Bryce Covert, Putting Gretchen Carlson’s Multi-Million-Dollar Settlement in Context, THINK 
PROGRESS (Sept. 7, 2016, 12:01 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/carlson-settlement-harassment-
accfa1726eb [https://perma.cc/T34B-YTHR]. 
29. See, e.g., KENNETH FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO 
COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005). 
30. Id. at xxi. 
31. Id. at 71–72.
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than other 9/11 victims. The victims on airplanes were said to have suffered 
more because they witnessed the terrorists up close, or, alternatively, the 
victims at the World Trade Center suffered more because they were trapped 
in a collapsing building. Survivors claimed to have suffered more because 
they were newlyweds, or, alternatively, married for decades.32 Feinberg 
was acutely aware that these dollar awards for pain and suffering were also 
seen as reflections of the worth of those lost in the 9/11 tragedy. Mindful of 
the symbolic significance of the financial settlements, he concluded that it 
was best to give the same amount of compensation for pain and suffering to 
all of the similarly-situated claimants.33 In sum, the work on money 
damages in tort law indicates that financial awards and settlements can 
restore the dignity of the plaintiff, but the amount that is required to effect 
dignity restoration is inevitably contextual and comparative.
A second question is whether the dignitary meaning of money 
damages depends in part on who is providing financial compensation. Does 
it matter whether the individual wrongdoer, an insurance company, or—
even in some circumstances—the government is the source of financial 
compensation? An extensive body of psychological research has found 
that, after experiencing events that have caused inequity in a relationship, 
the restoration of equity increases the satisfaction of those in the 
relationship.34 Therefore, we would expect that compensation from a 
wrongdoer who directly provides compensation to an injured person should 
be more satisfying to the person who has been injured.
Research confirms that the identity of the provider of financial 
compensation is critically important to the plaintiff’s restoration of dignity. 
In one illustrative experiment, people received compensation from either a 
wrongdoer or a neutral third party; in line with the theory, they expressed 
more satisfaction when they obtained compensation from the wrongdoer.35
Interestingly, other experiments have shown that when compensation is 
paid by the wrongdoer as opposed to a third party, the amount of 
compensation awarded increases. Jonathan Baron and Ilana Ritov presented 
participants with a series of tort cases, experimentally varying how the 
injured plaintiff would be compensated. In some versions of the cases, the 
company that caused the victim’s harm paid a dollar amount directly to the 
victim. Other versions had the company initially make a payment to the 
32. Id. at 75–76.
33. Id. at 76–77.
34. ROBBENNOLT & HANS, supra note 10, at 115–16. 
35. See generally Andre deCarufel, Victims’ Satisfaction with Compensation: Effects of Initial 
Disadvantage and Third Party Intervention, 11 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 445 (1981).
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government, which in turn gave the compensation to the victim. People 
were more generous when the victim received direct payments. Baron and
Ritov concluded that “setting the balance right between the injurer . . . and 
the victim” was an important driver of damage awards.”36 Another 
experiment found that punitive damage awards were higher when 
participants were given the option of making an award to the individual 
who was harmed, instead of to the state treasury.37 These studies all 
reinforce the idea that a prime purpose of money damages is the restoration 
of equity and balance between the defendant and the injured plaintiff.
It should be noted, however, that depending on the process, financial 
compensation from third parties may also restore equity and the dignity of 
victims—although the route to dignity restoration may be more indirect.38
The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund described earlier offers one example. 
Another is an innovative program in Belgium in which the state provides 
monetary compensation for emotional harm stemming from the death or 
severe injury of a close relative.39 The modest amounts are intended to be 
primarily symbolic. However, participants in the program reported that the 
monetary compensation “made them feel recognized and supported in the 
loss they had personally suffered and that this had helped them to come to 
terms with their loss.”40 If the process of compensation allows participants 
a voice, and treats them with respect, third party compensation can be 
effective in dignity restoration, as Atuahene found in the property context.
The psychological appeal of receiving compensation directly from the 
wrongdoer raises an interesting issue. Most compensation for injury is 
provided outside the formal legal system, and by parties other than the 
defendant who directly caused the harm. The existence of vicarious liability 
means that companies are on the hook for at least some of their employees’ 
wrongdoing. Roger Ailes, for example, did not contribute to Fox News’s 
$20 million payment to his victim Gretchen Carlson. Commentators have 
extolled the efficiencies of mechanisms such as no-fault insurance and 
other loss-spreading approaches. But, as Daniel Shuman pointed out some 
years ago, these benefits should be balanced against the positive 
36. Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties and Compensation in the Context of 
Tort Law, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17, 31 (1993).
37. Michelle Chernikoff Anderson & Robert MacCoun, Goal Conflict in Jurors’ Assessments of 
Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313 (1999).
38. See discussion in ROBBENNOLT & HANS, supra note 10, at 116. See also Catherine Sharkey, 
Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 440 (2003).
39. ROBBENNOLT & HANS, supra note 10, at 116.
40. Liesbeth Hulst & Arno J. Akkermans, Can Money Symbolize Acknowledgment? How Victims’
Relatives Perceive Monetary Awards for Their Emotional Harm, 4 PSYCHOL. INJ. & L. 245, 255–56 
(2011). See discussion in ROBBENNOLT & HANS, supra note 10, at 116. 
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psychological impact for plaintiffs of receiving compensation directly from 
those who have harmed them.41 Direct payments are apt to be more potent 
in restoring the dignity of the injured person.
To summarize, money damages can operate to restore the dignity of a 
person who has been injured in tort or deprived of property. A financial 
award or settlement conveys an acknowledgment of the wrong and signals 
the reestablishment of equity between defendant and plaintiff. Whether the 
award is seen as adequate to fully restore dignity is influenced by context, 
especially comparison cases. And financial compensation directly provided 
by the defendant holds greater promise for dignity restoration.
III. CONCLUSION
The symposium raises a host of important theoretical and empirical 
questions about the key concept of dignity. I’m grateful to Bernadette 
Atuahene for encouraging me and other conference presenters to push 
beyond traditional legal scholarship in the property field, adapting the ideas 
of dignity takings and dignity restoration to other legal questions. Both the 
conference and this symposium issue reflect the rich conversations that 
have ensued as authors adapted and applied ideas associated with dignity 
takings and dignity restoration to other legal fields. Her encouragement led 
me to focus more centrally on what many assume to be a side benefit of 
money damage awards in tort cases: the ability of money damages to 
restore the dignity of an injured plaintiff. Analyzing the idea of dignity in 
tort cases, I found many resonances with Atuahene’s property-based 
analysis, even though many injured plaintiffs did not suffer the extreme 
dehumanization and infantilization that Atuahene identifies as a defining 
characteristic of dignity takings. As work in this area proceeds, I encourage 
researchers to consider whether the concept of dignity in property law, so 
effectively deployed by Atuahene and other authors, is distinguishable 
from dignity in other legal domains.
41. See generally Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN.
L. REV. 39 (1994). 
